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INTERNING DISSENT: THE LAW OF
LARGE POLITICAL EVENTS
AARON JOHNSON

*

INTRODUCTION
Despite the Supreme Court’s recurrent indications that content1
based distinctions pose the greatest danger to liberty of expression,
the central problems facing free speech today are primarily contentneutral. Several developments support this conclusion. For one, the
Supreme Court has made clear over the past two decades that almost
any content-based restriction on expression will fail, unless it involves
2
some long-recognized category of unprotected speech. The Court has
struck down content-based restrictions targeting even some of the
ugliest and most disturbing types of expression imaginable—cross
3
4
burning, depictions of animal cruelty, and protests outside the
Copyright © 2013 Aaron Johnson.
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and the editorial staff of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy.
1. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (“[R]estrictions based on
viewpoint . . . are particularly pernicious.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its
purest form . . . .”).
2. Similarly, the Court has strongly suggested that it is not likely to recognize any new
categories of unprotected speech. For example, in United States v. Stevens, the Court addressed
a challenge to a statute aimed at “crush videos,” a particularly nasty type of pornography. See
559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010). The Government argued, based on a cost-benefit analysis, that
depictions of animal cruelty should be considered a class of unprotected speech. Id. at 469–72.
The Court rejected this argument in no uncertain terms. See id. at 470 (“As a free-floating test
for First Amendment coverage, [an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis] is startling and dangerous.”).
However, the Court did note that it is at least fair to describe the recognized categories of
unprotected speech as reflecting just such an analysis, even if that description carries no real
jurisprudential force. See id. at 470–71. And though the Court formally left open the door for
the future recognition of categories of unprotected speech, it is hard to imagine what might
qualify if depictions of animal torture do not. See id. at 472. Few types of speech reflect such a
lopsided cost-benefit analysis, and it is difficult to imagine what sort of retelling of history might
turn up a category of speech we have always forbidden, but never sufficiently identified.
3. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding unconstitutional the
provision in the Virginia cross burning statute that treats any cross burning as prima facie
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5

military funerals of fallen soldiers. Nor are these examples isolated.
There is only one still-valid Court decision applying strict scrutiny to
6
uphold what it recognized as a content-based restriction, and that
7
case pitted free speech against national security interests. It is thus
fair to say that once a federal court determines that a restriction is
8
content-based, the restriction will fall. In almost every case, this
evidence of intent to intimidate); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (holding facially unconstitutional St.
Paul’s ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated crime, including cross burning).
4. See Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (concluding that the federal statute enacted to criminalize the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty is overbroad and
facially unconstitutional).
5. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (stating that the speech of church
members who picketed near the funeral of a gay soldier is protected speech under the First
Amendment).
6. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 196 (1983) (“[T]he Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction
that it has considered in the past quarter-century.”).
7. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (holding that the
material-support statute enacted by Congress, which prohibits providing material support or
resources to foreign terrorist organizations, does not violate the plaintiffs’ free speech and is
constitutional under the First Amendment). Somewhat confusingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion for the majority never states explicitly that it is applying strict scrutiny, despite the fact
that this is the well-established test for content-based distinctions that do not fall within an
exception to the First Amendment. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385–86, 395 (stating that strict
scrutiny is appropriate for content-based distinctions). However, the Court explicitly states that
it is applying a standard higher than “intermediate scrutiny,” Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. at 2723, and the analysis generally proceeds as if the Court were applying strict scrutiny,
albeit without evoking the familiar vocabulary of “compelling state interests” and “narrow
tailoring.”
8. However, this inquiry is sometimes murkier than might be supposed. See, e.g., R.
George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a
Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 337 (2006) (“[C]ourts [attempting to distinguish
content-based from content neutral regulations] incompatibly talk both of focusing their inquiry
on the text or face of the regulation, and of a broader judicial inquiry into the legislative intent,
purpose, and justification of the regulation.”). Perhaps most tellingly, a circuit split has started
to develop on this very issue. Some circuits focus on the text and operation of the statute, and
have held that a regulation is content-based if a government actor must look to the content of
the speech to determine whether the regulation applies. See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters. v. City
of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that the zoning code’s definition
of ‘sign’ is impermissibly content-based because the message conveyed determines whether the
speech is subject to the restriction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A regulatory scheme that requires
the government to examine the content of the message that is conveyed is content-based
regardless of its motivating purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Conversely, others
have held that an inquiry into legislative purpose is required. In these circuits, a regulation will
be considered content-based—even if it openly distinguishes categories of speech—only if there
was some discriminatory or censorial legislative intent. See, e.g., Brown v. Town of Cary, 706
F.3d 294, 301–02 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Content neutrality bars only one particular sort of
distinction—those made with a censorial intent to value some forms of speech over others to
distort public debate, to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or to prohibit the expression of an [offensive or disagreeable] idea . . . .” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609,
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classification is outcome-determinative.
But there is more than a process of elimination to support the
conclusion that content-neutral restrictions are the greater threat. As
commentators have long observed, content-neutral speech restrictions
can, in practice, be incredibly burdensome on free expression. Few
areas of law illustrate this point as well as the recent case law of large
political conventions and similar events, which is the focus of this
Article.
Political conventions provide a particularly good example of the
burdens of content-neutral restrictions for three reasons. First, what is
at stake is generally core political speech, which the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized as “at the heart of the First
9
Amendment’s protection.” Indeed, the Court has stated explicitly
that political speech has “always rested on the highest rung of the
10
hierarchy of First Amendment values” and is “entitled to special
11
protection.” Thus, if anything, one would expect the application of a
stricter legal standard, or at least a stricter application of the general
content-neutral legal standard, for restrictions on expression at major
political conventions. Yet that is not the case.
Second, the key dangers presented by strict restrictions at large
political conventions are exactly those presented by restrictions that
are explicitly content-based—namely, that the government will seek
to distort the marketplace of ideas and shape in a self-serving way the
12
search for political truth. It is true that content-neutral regulations,
by definition, do not depend on viewpoint. But the fact of the matter
is the burdens of such regulations at political conventions fall
13
disproportionately on the shoulders of dissent. Modern major
622 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The plaintiffs argue that the ordinances . . . are content based because they
distinguish between various types of signs—and thus various types of protected speech—by
content. . . . There is simply nothing in the record to indicate that the distinctions . . . reflect a
meaningful preference for one type of speech . . . .”).
9. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
10. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); see also Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (“The
First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
11. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
12. See Stone, supra note 6, at 198.
13. Nor is this mere legal hypochondria: In several cases, convention officials have barred
everyone from entering within hundreds of yards of the convention site, except individuals given
special credentials by those officials. See, e.g., ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1153 (D. Colo. 2008); Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston
(Coal. to Protest the DNC), 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D. Mass. 2004); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v.
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political conventions are not debates—they are publicity
extravaganzas, devoted to promoting the platform and candidate of a
dominant political party. With all speech, across the board, confined
by a content-neutral limitation, all that sees the light of day is the
party orthodoxy. This is arguably the chief problem against which the
14
First Amendment should guard.
Third, the body of case law surrounding large political
conventions illustrates how contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence, despite common perceptions, is not nearly as protective
of free expression as may be commonly thought. The doctrine
governing time, manner, and place (TMP) restrictions, especially as
applied to large political events such as national political conventions,
has been deferential to government interests, and has generally
privileged those interests over individual interests in free expression.
That such a doctrine could develop around a constitutional
amendment dedicated, perhaps above all else, to allowing dissenters
to speak truth to power, is disconcertingly ironic.
This Article addresses several aspects of that development. Part I
reviews the general framework applicable to content-neutral TMP
restrictions. Part II discusses two cases central to the development of
this area of law. Part III describes general trends in the outcomes and
analyses of key cases. Finally, Part IV suggests small changes that, if
adopted, would make the doctrine more speech-protective.

City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968–69 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Perhaps the most direct
recognition of the targeting of protest came in Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado
Springs, in which the court held that “[i]t was not impermissible for the City to draw a
distinction between [non-protesters] and those seeking to protest the NATO conference,
because the City made a reasonable assumption that protestors could pose more of a security
risk to the conference than other persons.” 477 F.3d 1212, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. See Stone, supra note 6, at 198.
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I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Though the distinction between content-based and content15
neutral restrictions originally had an equal protection cast, the
general framework for content-neutral TMP restrictions was settled
16
early and has been relatively clear for some time. Restrictions are
considered content-neutral when they are “justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech,” regardless of whether they
have “an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
17
others.” Similarly, restrictions are considered content-neutral even
when they create exceptions for certain categories of potential
speakers, as long as those exceptions are independent of the content of
18
any speech in which those speakers might engage. However, facially
content-neutral restrictions cannot grant overly broad discretion to a
regulating official, and must “contain adequate standards to guide the
19
official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.”
Regulations granting overly broad discretion are unconstitutional
20
because that discretion can chill speech and can be used “to favor or
15. See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (finding that the Illinois statute was inconsistent “with
the command of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . because the statute discriminate[d] among
pickets based on the subject matter of their expression” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–95 (1972) (“Because Chicago treats some
picketing differently from others, we analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Kenneth Karst took this ideal seriously and famously
argued that a principle of equality, understood as equal liberty, lies at the heart of the First
Amendment and reflects the key First Amendment values of democratic self-governance, the
search for truth, and autonomous self-expression. Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 (1975). This ideal can partially explain the
development of differential treatment for content-based and content-neutral regulations. Yet,
the principle of equality (however understood) cannot, by itself, offer full protection for these
values because they can still be undermined by restrictions that weigh heavily—if equally—
across all different types of messages.
16. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [TMP] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”).
17. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986) (defining content-neutral regulations).
18. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a regulation requiring permits for events involving more than
twenty individuals is content-neutral, despite an exception for “casual park use by visitors or
tourists,” because the regulation “does not turn on the message, if any, espoused by visitors or
tourists [but instead] refers to the manner in which groups larger than twenty assemble”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).
20. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) (“[Such
regulations can] intimidate[] parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and
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21

disfavor speech based on its content.”
Once a restriction has been deemed a content-neutral restriction
on the time, manner, or place of speech, that restriction will be upheld
22
if it satisfies three requirements (the TMP elements). First, the law
23
must serve a substantial government interest. Though there is no
general test for what makes an interest constitutionally “substantial,”
a number of interests have been deemed to meet this threshold
including providing security, maintaining the orderly flow of traffic on
24
streets and sidewalks, and preserving public facilities. Second, the
25
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. This is
not the sort of narrow-tailoring analysis used in First Amendment
26
cases that employ strict scrutiny, and there is no requirement that the
27
government utilize the least restrictive measures. Instead, the
government need only show a “reasonable fit” between the regulation
28
and the interest served. Third, the restriction must leave open ample
29
alternatives for conveying the same message. This inquiry is
power are never actually abused.”).
21. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
153 (1969) (“[Unfettered discretion allows officials] to roam at will, dispensing or withholding
permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions . . . .”).
22. E.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
23. Courts sometimes refer to the need for a “significant” government interest, rather than
a “substantial” one. See, e.g., ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D.
Colo. 2008). The Supreme Court has used the terms interchangeably. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796
(stating that the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. See infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
25. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government
may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”).
27. E.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (“Regulations that burden
speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of expression . . . . [are not invalid]
simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech.”).
28. ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
29. E.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (“[Speech]
regulations . . . [must] leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, some cases merely speak of a need for
“adequate” alternatives. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (“[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining
modes of communication are inadequate.”). Although these different terms can be (and have
been) used selectively to frame the issue, an easy way to square this variable use of terminology
is to hold that alternatives are not “adequate” unless they are “ample.” See, e.g., City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (“[Content-neutral regulation] must leave open
ample alternative channels for communication. . . . [W]e are not persuaded
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30

generally fact-intensive, and it is unclear whether or not there is any
31
constitutional right to reach one’s intended audience.
II. TWO KEY CASES
Though the Supreme Court has never addressed restrictions on
major political conventions, lower federal courts have applied the
general framework just outlined to all recent cases concerning large
political conventions. Two cases are key to understanding the overall
development of this area of law, and they should be considered in
32
tandem. The first, Menotti v. City of Seattle, demonstrates how
quickly a large political event can inspire violent protest. Combined
with the September 11th attacks, it should be no surprise that security
interests were at the forefront of post-2001 lower court opinions. The
33
second case, Coalition to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston,
illustrates just how far courts would allow government to go in the
name of security—and at the expense of free speech interests.
A. Menotti v. City of Seattle
In Menotti, the Ninth Circuit addressed the local government’s
response to the riots that broke out in the early days of the 1999
World Trade Organization (WTO) conference. The City faced serious
that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off.”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. E.g., ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (“[T]he Court discerns that the ‘ample
alternatives’ element is a multi-factor, fact-intensive inquiry.”).
31. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times
and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). The Supreme Court has not clearly decided
the issue and lower courts have reached different conclusions. Compare Harrington v. City of
Brentwood, 726 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The key for purposes of the adequatealternatives analysis is whether the proffered alternatives allow the speaker to reach its intended
audience.” (citation omitted)), with McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In the
last analysis, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted particularized
access to their desired audience. As long as adequate alternative means of communication exist,
the First Amendment is not infringed.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). Though this case does not technically address a large
political convention, but rather the riots at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999,
Menotti has been discussed in several later cases addressing large political events. See, e.g.,
Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1224 (“[T]he City made a reasonable assumption that
protestors could pose more of a security risk to the conference than other persons, an
assumption that, for example, finds some support given the violent protests surrounding the
World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, Washington.”); Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[D]esignated protest or demonstration zones is a relatively
recent innovation; they have apparently become routine at large political events ever since the
1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle.”).
33. 327 F. Supp. 2d 61(D. Mass. 2004).
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problems: Despite the fact that over ninety-nine percent of
34
demonstrators were well-behaved and orderly, parts of Seattle
35
descended into “seeming war zones.” Within the first day of the
WTO conference, this one percent of rogue protesters looted and
broke windows at retail stores, started fires in the streets and in
dumpsters, then blocked fire trucks from entering the area, and even
36
assaulted WTO delegates and the driver of a garbage truck. A few of
37
these violent protesters were “well-organized and . . . coordinated,”
38
and some were even armed with Molotov cocktails.
39
The police responded with tear gas, beanbag guns, rubber bullets,
40
and about 300 arrests. Seattle Mayor Paul Schell declared a civil
emergency, imposed a general curfew, and the Governor called out
41
the National Guard. A sizeable section of downtown Seattle was
closed off to everyone except WTO delegates and staff members, the
owners and employees of businesses in the section, and emergency
42
and safety personnel, though this closure was soon limited to
43
banning only protesters. Violent protest eased, but did not stop
44
entirely.
Confronted with both individual lawsuits and a class action
45
seeking damages for First Amendment violations, the Ninth Circuit
46
generally affirmed the government’s actions. As a threshold matter,
the court held that the curfew and ban were content-neutral, even
47
though they predominately affected anti-WTO protesters, because
48
the “literal command of the restraint” was content-neutral;
34. Menotti, 409 F.3d. at 1123.
35. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 1121–23.
37. Id. at 1123.
38. Id. at 1120. In several situations, nonviolent protesters facilitated violent protest by
forming a buffer between violent protesters and police. Id. at 1132.
39. Id. at 1122.
40. Id. at 1126.
41. Id. at 1124.
42. Id. at 1125.
43. Id. at 1125–26.
44. Id. at 1126.
45. Id. at 1117–18.
46. Id. at 1118. The court held that the City’s actions were constitutional on their face, but
that there was a material issue of fact regarding their constitutionality as applied to the specific
plaintiffs in the case. Id.
47. Id. at 1129 (noting that Order No. 3, which closed off sections of Seattle to protesters,
but not to delegates, business-owners, or employees, “predominantly affected protest[e]rs with
anti-WTO views,” but this “did not render it content based”).
48. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of government intent is somewhat
confusing. In one sentence, it wrote that “the text of Order No. 3 is not in dispute, and it does
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accordingly, the TMP framework applied. The court then went on to
hold that the government had significant interests in maintaining
49
security, and that the blanket prohibition on protest was narrowly
tailored—despite its large geographic scope—because it had become
“unrealistic to expect police to be able to distinguish, minute by
minute, those protestors with benign intentions and those with violent
50
intentions.” And the ability to protest elsewhere in downtown
51
Seattle provided protesters with adequate alternatives.
B. Coalition to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston
The second key case is Coalition to Protest the DNC, in which a
Massachusetts district court upheld severe restrictions on expression
at the 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC) against
52
expedited pre-Convention challenges seeking injunctive relief. The
most important of these restrictions was the creation of a designated
“demonstration zone” for protesters. Although protest was also
allowed within a separate “soft security zone,” capacity there was
53
limited, and the demonstration zone provided the best access to
54
DNC delegates.

not favor one content over another.” Id. With this sentence, the court appears to commit itself
to a form of textualism in which the government’s motive is irrelevant to the analysis. The court
even underscores this commitment with a footnote stating that it “will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” Id. at 1130
n.29 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, immediately after that first sentence, the court wrote that “[t]he purpose of
enacting Order No. 3 had everything to do with the need to restore and maintain civic order,
and nothing to do with the content of [the protesters’] message.” Id. at 1129. This reference is in
accord with the long-established need for a significant government interest.
49. Id. at 1131 (“No one could seriously dispute that the government has a significant
interest in maintaining public order; indeed this is a core duty that the government owes its
citizens.”).
50. Id. at 1134. This sort of blanket prohibition is difficult to square with existing First
Amendment concepts like overbreadth. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234,
255 (2002) (“The argument, in essence, is that protected speech may be banned as a means to
ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns the First Amendment upside down.”).
51. Menotti, 409 F.3d. at 1141.
52. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64–65 (D. Mass. 2004). The First Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding in Coalition to Protest the DNC in Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City
of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
53. Coalition to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 65. In addition, within the “soft
security zone,” tables and chairs were prohibited, and demonstrations involving more than
twenty individuals required a permit. See id. at 65–66.
54. Id. at 74. One edge of the demonstration zone was “the only available location
providing a direct interface between demonstrators, and the area where delegates will enter and
leave the [convention site].”
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Conditions in the demonstration zone were oppressive: The
demonstration zone was surrounded by two rows of concrete barriers
topped with eight foot chain-link fencing, and the outer fence was
coated with a dense fabric to prevent demonstrators from throwing
55
liquids at delegates. Large portions of this fabric limited visibility of
56
any passers-by and prevented demonstrators from handing out
57
materials. Visibility was further reduced by the presence of a “twostory ‘media village’” between the demonstration zone and the
58
convention site. In addition, much of the demonstration zone was
located directly beneath railroad tracks, which were wrapped with
59
razor wire and patrolled by armed police and National Guardsmen.
As a result of the tracks and the supporting girders, much of the space
within the demonstration zone was unfit for many types of
demonstrations, and the number of people who could demonstrate
60
effectively was limited.
61
The district court expressed concern over these conditions. At
various times, it likened the demonstration zone to an “internment
62
camp,” and described it as “an offense to the spirit of the First
63
Amendment.” Yet, despite these reservations, the court upheld the
use of the demonstration zone as “reasonable” and thus
constitutionally acceptable, in light of the circumstances:
The double fence is reasonable in light of past experience in which
demonstrators have pushed over a single fence. A second fence
may prevent this altogether, or at least give police officers more
time to respond and protect the delegates. The liquid dispersion
fabric is reasonable in light of past experience in which
demonstrators have squirted liquids such as bleach or urine at
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id. at 66 (“The purpose of this [fabric], according to the [Boston Police Department] is
‘to protect the delegates and other attendees, and to prevent hostile viewers from determining
the strength and positioning of . . . law enforcement assets.’” (second alteration in original)).
57. Id. at 68 (“It will be . . . completely impossible to pass a leaflet from the
[demonstration zone] to a delegate or other DNC guest, even one who wants to approach the
edge of the [demonstration zone] to receive the literature.”).
58. Id. at 72.
59. Id. at 67.
60. Id. (“Although the City calculated that some 4,000 persons could be accommodated in
the entire [demonstration zone], this effectively usable area can accommodate approximately
1,500 persons.”).
61. Photos of the demonstration zone are available online. See Emily Steinmetz,
Democratic? National Convention Comes to Denver, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 3, 2008),
http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/democratic-national-convention-comes-to-denver.
62. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
63. Id. at 87.
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delegates or police. The overhead netting is reasonable in light of
past experience in which demonstrators have thrown objects over
fences. The razor wire atop the [railroad] tracks . . . is reasonable in
light of the possibility of demonstrators climbing upon the tracks
and using them as an access point to breach the hard zone
perimeter and/or rain objects on delegates, media, or law
64
enforcement personnel from above.

In short, each of these restrictions was reasonable, despite the lack
65
of any specific threats of such tactics, because “there [was] no way to
‘tweak’ the [demonstration zone] to improve plaintiffs’ free speech
66
opportunities without creating a safety hazard” and protesters
67
retained “other opportunities for communication.” Accordingly, the
security plans, though onerous, were constitutional. In so holding, the
district court set the stage for equally oppressive measures at later
political events.
III. GENERAL TRENDS IN THE CASE LAW
Since the WTO riots described in Menotti, and especially since
Coalition to Protest the DNC, federal courts have continued to apply
the content-neutral TMP framework in a way that privileges
68
government regulations over free expression. For example, in ACLU
69
of Colorado v. Denver, the District of Colorado upheld a security
plan that limited protest to a “Public/Demonstration Zone”
70
surrounded by concrete barriers and two rows of fencing. At that
location, the convention was not even visible, and the only access
demonstrators had to the delegates was from 200 feet away as the
71
delegates walked from their buses into the convention. Similarly, in
72
Marcavage v. City of New York, the Southern District of New York
upheld the arrests of two anti-abortion demonstrators, who peacefully
64. Id. at 75.
65. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The appellant
points out, correctly, that there is no evidence in the record that the City had information
indicating that demonstrators intended to use such tactics at the Convention.”).
66. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
67. Id. at 75.
68. For a review of some of the tactics used to crackdown on protesters at these
conventions, see generally Joshua Rissman, Put it on Ice: Chilling Free Speech at National
Conventions, 27 LAW & INEQ. 413 (2009).
69. 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Colo. 2008).
70. Id. at 1149.
71. Id. at 1155–56.
72. Marcavage v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 4945(RJS), 2010 WL 3910355, *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
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carried signs no larger than four-by-six feet, because they refused to
move from a “no expressive activity zone” to the designated
73
“demonstration area” two blocks from the convention. Other cases
74
are similar. Only two cases, Service Employees International Union v.
75
76
City of Los Angeles (SEIU) and Stauber v. City of New York —both
of which were decided before Coalition to Protest the DNC—favored
the First Amendment plaintiffs (and these cases may have limited
77
reach).

73. Id. at *10.
74. See Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d
1014, 1023–24 (D. Minn. 2008) (upholding the decision to deny a requested parade permit and
to grant instead a permit for a different route, because it would slow traffic and divert police
resources); Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (upholding the denial of a permit for a rally on the night before the Republican National
Convention started because the number of attendees might exceed estimates, and this might
damage the lawn at the site of the rally, especially in the event of rain). Similar decisions have
been rendered in cases dealing with large gatherings other than national political conventions.
See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1217, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2007) (protesters outside a NATO conference); Defending Animal Rights Today and
Tomorrow v. Wash. Sports and Entm’t LP, 821 F. Supp. 2d 97, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (animal
rights protesters outside a circus); United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F.
Supp. 2d 19, 30–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (peace protesters outside the United Nations Building).
75. 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
76. No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, *33 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
77. The First Amendment-friendly result in Service Employees International Union v. City
of Los Angeles is likely attributable to two things. First, the restrictions involved were arguably
more severe than even those employed at the 2004 DNC in Boston: 185 acres (8 million square
feet) surrounding the convention were made off-limits to demonstrators, and protest was
restricted to a “secured zone” over 250 yards away, with only a blocked view of the convention,
and on the other side of a major highway. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968–72.
Thus, to the extent it establishes a ceiling on the restrictions that can be imposed in the name of
security, that ceiling is high and few measures are prohibited. Second, this decision was written
in 2000, before the terror attacks of September 11th. It is not inconceivable that a First
Amendment plaintiff would have lost on the exact same set of facts in 2004, or even 2010. The
reach of Stauber is similarly limited for two reasons. First, the police tactics addressed in Stauber
were not unique to the Republican National Convention (RNC), but had been employed more
widely. During a number of demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, the NYPD enforced a policy of
shutting down streets and sidewalks while making no or minimal efforts to tell attendees how
they could otherwise access the events. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *8–9. Even more
troubling, the NYPD commonly used barricades to create “pens” with only a single opening. Id.
at *9–10. Demonstrators often had difficulty leaving, and were sometimes told that they were
not allowed to leave the pen at all. Id. at *25. Had these practices been employed only at the
RNC and not used more widely, the court may have decided differently. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the chief of the NYPD testified at trial that allowing individuals to enter and
exit the pens “under controlled circumstances” would not undermine law enforcement. Id. at
*10, *28. Largely based on the chief’s testimony, the court concluded that “no security, safety or
organizational interests would be harmed by the NYPD making efforts to assure greater access
by demonstrators to and from pens.” Id. at *29.
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This overall pattern has resulted from several notable trends in
how courts have analyzed each of the three TMP elements. The next
section will summarize these trends and offer brief examples of how
they have thwarted First Amendment interests.
A. The Government Interest
Regarding the first element—that any restriction must serve a
substantial government interest—two trends stand out. First, courts
have identified a broad array of interests that qualify as at least
“substantial” or “significant.” These interests have included
78
79
maintaining security, controlling traffic on streets and sidewalks,
80
81
managing and maintaining park facilities and other public spaces,
82
83
reducing excessive noise, avoiding visual clutter, and, potentially,
preserving an environment in which business can be conducted
84
effectively. Because of this breadth, the first TMP element has been
uniformly satisfied in the context of large political conventions.
Frankly, it is difficult to imagine any large gathering in which at least
one of these interests would not be at issue.
Second, where implicated, the government’s interest in security
85
has weighed heavily. Some courts have referred to this interest as “a
86
core duty that the government owes its citizens,” whereas others

78. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2005) (“No one could seriously
dispute that the government has a significant interest in maintaining public order.”).
79. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1163 (D. Colo. 2008) (citing
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1997)).
80. Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984); Paulsen v.
Gotbam, 982 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1992)).
81. ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 296).
82. Id. at 1162 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1989)).
83. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (“[T]he visual
assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public
property . . . constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City’s power to prohibit.”).
84. See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1131–32 & n.34 (“The City [has] an interest in seeing that the .
. . delegates ha[ve] the opportunity to conduct their business at the chosen venue . . . .”).
85. As commentators have noted, “[t]he recent trend is for large-scale political events to
be designated as ‘National Special Security Events’ by the President, which makes the Secret
Service the lead federal agency in charge of the security for the event.” Joseph D. Herrold,
Note, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the “Caging” of First Amendment Rights,
54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 978 (2006). This development is troubling, not for doctrinal reasons, but
because this has sometimes led to blatant viewpoint discrimination. For example, at a speech in
West Virginia, the Secret Service ordered the arrest of two protesters for refusing to remove tshirts critical of President George W. Bush. Rank v. Jenkins, No. Civ.A.2:04 0997, 2006 WL
515533, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 28, 2006).
86. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1131.
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have noted that 9/11 changed not just the political landscape, but the
88
constitutional landscape as well. In several cases, despite opening
with language suggesting that security concerns do not automatically
89
trump expressive rights, courts have been explicitly deferential to the
needs of law enforcement. In Coalition to Protest the DNC, the court
opined that “the police must have adequate flexibility to make
judgments on the street concerning any emergency or public safety
issues, and [courts] should not fashion an injunction to control that
90
discretion.” The court was similarly complaisant in ACLU, noting
that “[s]imply put, some degree of deference must be afforded to the
government’s judgment as to the most effective means for achieving
91
its security goals.” Cases addressing restrictions at other types of
92
political events have been similar. Just as troubling, the evidence
93
required to establish a security interest has been minimal.
In some cases, security concerns provided a general backdrop—in
addition to being an element of the TMP test—against which the
94
other elements were appraised. This means that security was

87. As James J. Knicely and John W. Whitehead have observed, “[i]n a climate of fear of
threatened terrorist attacks, the potential for adverse political accountability by an unforgiving
polity is even higher if security measures fail to prevent disaster, particularly if the measures are
perceived as being undermined by an unelected Federal judiciary.” James J. Knicely & John W.
Whitehead, The Caging of Free Speech in America, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 468
(2005).
88. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he events of 9/11 and the constant reminders in the popular media of security
alerts color perceptions of the risks around us, including the perceptions of judges. The risks of
violence and the dire consequences of that violence seem more probable and more substantial
than they were before 9/11.”).
89. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. Colo. 2008) (“The
term ‘security’ cannot simply be brandished as a talisman to justify all burdens on speech.”
(citing Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13)).
90. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass. 2004).
91. ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of
Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13).
92. See, e.g., United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Court will not second guess or substitute its judgment for that of the
NYPD.”).
93. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13 (upholding measures to guard against
specific tactics even though “there [was] no evidence in the record that the City had information
indicating that demonstrators intended to use such tactics”).
94. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e apply
the ample alternatives test with a practical recognition of the dire facts confronting the city
[during the Seattle WTO riots].”); Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St.
Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The ample alternative channels analysis
cannot be conducted in an objective vacuum, but instead it must give ‘practical recognition’ to
the facts giving rise to the restriction on speech.” (quoting Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d
at 1226)).
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essentially double-counted—once as an element and again as a factor
in the analyses of the other two elements.
The best example to illustrate how this can work concerns not a
large political convention, but a banned protest outside a NATO
conference. In Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado
95
Springs, the Tenth Circuit actually triple-counted security concerns.
First, regarding the government’s interest in prohibiting protest within
96
several hundred yards of the conference, the court held that “the
97
City’s security interest is of the highest order,” especially in light of
the fact that defense officials from several countries would be
98
gathered together. Second, regarding the narrow-tailoring analysis,
the court opined that “the significance of the government interest
bears an inverse relationship to the rigor of the narrowly tailored
99
analysis.” Third, regarding the existence of ample alternatives, the
court opined that “given “the City’s need to . . . provide conference
security, we must determine whether the alternative protest [site] was
100
an adequate alternative.” Thus, the government interest in security
influenced the court’s holding on each element of the TMP restriction
analysis.
B. Narrow Tailoring
Regarding the second element—that any restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve the identified government interest—two
general trends are noteworthy. First, these analyses have been
101
uniformly fact-intensive. Accordingly, and as some courts have
102
explicitly acknowledged, the precedential value of any particular
95. 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007).
96. The protest was limited: Six individuals wanted to conduct a peace vigil on the
sidewalk across the street from the NATO conference, in which they would hold banners for
one hour. See id. at 1218. Because they were banned from protesting outside the conference,
they had little choice but to hold their vigil at a security checkpoint, located several blocks from
the conference, with no direct line of sight to the conference. Id. at 1218–19. Because they were
effectively invisible to their target audience, they asked officers to at least inform conference
attendees of their vigil, but “the officers declined.” Id. at 1219.
97. Id. at 1220.
98. See id. at 1221.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1226.
101. See, e.g., Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (describing
the case law on political conventions as “extremely factbound”); see also Menotti v. City of
Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1133 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The [large] size of the restricted zone cannot
sensibly be evaluated without considering the size of the area in which delegates were housed
and had to move freely in order to do the work of the WTO conference.”).
102. See, e.g., Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp.
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opinion is limited, and restrictions held constitutional in one context
103
may be invalidated in another. This, in turn, has given courts free
rein to reach the decision that seems most appropriate in a given
situation, with few constraints from precedent. Courts have thus been
able to couch in the normal vocabulary of the TMP elements what
104
actually operated as a reasonableness test or an interest-balancing
105
test, rather than a proper elements-based analysis.
Some courts have openly stated as much. In ACLU, for example,
the court conceded that “closing down [a major highway] to the daily
parades during the [DNC] w[ould] burden the expressive rights of
marchers,” but the court did not find that the burden was “substantial
when weighted against the Defendants’ interests in emergency
106
107
access.” Similarly, in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, the First
108
Circuit approved the “balance of [security] and other factors”
109
employed by the lower court in Coalition to Protest the DNC. SEIU
also referred to a need to “balance . . . the competing interests,”
though the district court for the Central District of California
110
eventually held in favor of the First Amendment plaintiffs. Other
cases dealing with large events besides national political conventions
111
have employed comparable language and reasoning.
2d 1014, 1022 (D. Minn. 2008) (referring to “the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry”).
103. See, e.g., id. (“Time-place-manner restrictions that may be constitutionally permissible
at one site and event may be held constitutionally infirm at another site and event.” (citing Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728)).
104. See Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (stating why each individual
restriction imposed was “reasonable” in light of past experience).
105. Such interest-balancing analyses are not entirely foreign to First Amendment cases,
and they play a role in cases involving speech by government employees on manners of public
concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (“Our task . . . is to seek a balance
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). However, interest-balancing seems to be limited to such cases, and the Supreme
Court has recently rejected the use of balancing tests in deciding other First Amendment
questions. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (determining whether
a category of speech deserves First Amendment Protection); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291 (2012) (addressing whether a union can collect dues from non-consenting
individuals).
106. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1186 (D. Colo. 2008).
107. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 14.
109. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
110. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
111. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We
recognize that our decision takes into account a balance of the competing considerations of
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, these narrow-tailoring
analyses have been undemanding. Courts addressing these speech
restrictions have commonly emphasized that there is no requirement
112
that the government employ the least restrictive measures, and that
the government need only show a “reasonable fit” between the
113
government interest and the restriction on speech.
Citizens for Peace in Space presents the best example of an
undemanding narrow-tailoring analysis. There, the Tenth Circuit
considered a challenge to a blanket ban on demonstration within
114
several hundred yards of a NATO conference. To guard against the
115
116
“catastrophic risk” provided by the “worst case scenario” of “a
117
terrorist attack utilizing explosives,” the City of Denver created a
“security zone” that extended several blocks from a NATO
118
conference site in all directions. The group Citizens for Peace in
Space sought to conduct an hour-long peace vigil on the sidewalk
across the street from the conference, in which six individuals would
119
hold banners. Though no other group had asked to protest within
120
the secured zone, the City refused their request, partially because
allowing their protest might encourage other groups to protest as
121
well. The possible alternative of using a permitting scheme was
insufficient because it would have required a diversion of resources
122
and personnel. This blanket prohibition was upheld as narrowly

expression and order. But we do not think the Constitution requires otherwise.”); United for
Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The City’s
significant interest in . . . safety [outside the UN building], especially in this time of heightened
security, outweigh[s] the restrictions on the Plaintiff.”).
112. E.g., Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138 (“A time, place, and manner restriction does not violate
the First Amendment simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less
burdensome on speech.” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985));
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or
in any manner that may be desired.” (citations omitted)).
113. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1179 (D. Colo. 2008).
114. See Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2007).
115. Id. at 1225.
116. Id. at 1224.
117. Id. at 1217.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1218.
120. See id. at 1223.
121. Id. at 1218.
122. See id. at 1225 (“Though we agree that some content-neutral permitting system could
have been enacted, we do not agree with the Citizens that such a system is an obvious
alternative that easily could have been utilized without diverting resources and personnel.”).
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tailored because another group might seek to protest NATO, that
group might become violent, and that violence might have been more
123
than the City could handle. Yet to ban one protest because it might
encourage other protest is patently inconsistent with general notions
of narrow tailoring.
Besides being extremely deferential, these analyses have
occasionally been loose and undisciplined. In at least two cases, courts
suggested that the plaintiffs, rather than the government, bore the
124
burden of proof on the issue of narrow tailoring. In another, the
court suggested that the narrow-tailoring analysis was closer to a
rational basis test, such that the restriction would be valid so long as it
125
had the desired effect. On the whole, this looseness, like the lack of
precedential constraints, has favored the government’s interests over
those of demonstrators.
C. Ample Alternatives
Regarding the third element—that any restriction must leave
open ample or adequate alternatives of communication—again, two
related trends are of special importance. First, as with the narrow-

123. See id. at 1224 (rejecting the contention “that all protest groups would be peaceful and
law-abiding” as an unrealistic “best-case scenario”).
124. See Marcavage v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 4945(RJS), 2010 WL 3910355, *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (“Because Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge or engage the situation
specific inquiry of intermediate scrutiny, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed
alternative is neither reasonable nor constitutionally required.”); Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v.
City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Nor has the [plaintiff] established
. . . that the Parks Department’s denial of its application was not narrowly tailored to achieve
the City’s significant interest of managing and maintaining the Great Lawn [in Central Park].”).
There is some Supreme Court language to support this reasoning, at least regarding the
requirement that ample alternatives for expression remain. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (“That the city’s limitations on volume may reduce to some
degree the potential audience for respondent’s speech is of no consequence, for there has been
no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate.”). However, later
Supreme Court cases (including those citing Ward), have stated that the burden of proof in
analyzing content-neutral restrictions falls on the government. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (“[T]he Government still bears the burden of showing
that the remedy it has adopted does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further [the government’s] interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1179 (D. Colo. 2008) (“The
Court agrees that the closure of streets inside and adjacent to the [site of the DNC] is a
reasonable fit to address concerns that people may obstruct traffic to or from the Convention
grounds; one cannot obstruct a street if no one has access to it.”). If such reasoning were sound,
then, the entire city of Denver could have been shut down, because this would presumably
provide a safer convention site than would closing down only parts of it. The proper question
for a narrow-tailoring test, of course, is not whether the measure actually does what it is
supposed to do, but whether it does substantially more than it must.
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tailoring requirement, courts have noted that the “ample alternatives”
126
inquiry is heavily fact-dependent. This means that each case is
largely unhinged from precedent, and courts have considerable
discretion to decide what is constitutional and what is not based on
127
the circumstances at hand, with little input from past decisions.
Without such restrictions, courts have also broadly construed what
qualifies as “ample.” For example, the ability to speak to media
128
129
outlets, to protest in other locations in the city, or to protest
130
outside the hotel rooms of event attendees has often been enough
to justify restrictions on protest near the target audience. The
existence of restrictive demonstration zones has qualified as providing
131
adequate alternative outlets. The only real requirement seems to be
that the ability to convey the desired message not be wholly closed
132
off. As a result of these broad readings—and the low threshold for
adequacy—it is difficult to imagine a realistic contemporary scenario
in which protesters would not have adequate alternative outlets. Any
demonstrators with messages that depend on a specific time and place
for effective delivery, or that seek to convey a message to the
delegates themselves, are simply out of luck.

126. E.g., id. at 1164 (“[T]he Court discerns that the ‘ample alternatives’ element is a multifactor, fact-intensive inquiry.”).
127. However, this has not been uniformly true. For example, in Coalition to March on the
RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, the court explicitly reviewed the degree of restraint
imposed on protesters’ messages in prior cases, and how that compared to the channels
available to protesters there. See 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028–30 (D. Minn. 2008) (comparing
alternative channels in prior cases to the ones available to the plaintiffs).
128. Id. at 1029 (“[M]edia may afford ample alternatives to firsthand expression at high
profile events.”); see also Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“At
a high-profile event, such as the [DNC], messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight of the
delegates nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through television, radio, the
press, the internet, and other outlets.”). But see Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1174
(9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e should dispel any notion that media interest in an event can be a
substitute for constitutionally-required alternative avenues of communication. . . . Public
protests are at the heart of the First Amendment and are critical for incubating civic
engagement and encouraging spirited debate.”).
129. See id. at 1141 (finding that other protest locations throughout Washington were ample
alternatives to the downtown area).
130. See id.
131. See ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1182 (2008) (finding that a
restricted “Public/Demonstration Zone” presents an adequate alternative method of
communication).
132. See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138 (“[T]he Supreme Court generally will not strike down a
governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communication
unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression across
the landscape of a particular community or setting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Second, most federal courts have held that protesters at political
conventions do not have any particular right to reach their intended
133
audience. Although these holdings have usually been phrased in
134
general terms, or in terms suggesting that the protesters sought
135
recognition of a “special” right beyond what others enjoy, the end
result has been the same: There has been very little practical
recognition of a right to reach the target audience. For all these
reasons, even very strict restrictions on speech have been upheld in
federal courts.
IV. BETTER ANALYSES AND BETTER DOCTRINE
If the current case law on national political conventions has gone
too far in favoring government interests over political protest, what
can we do about it now? Part of the answer has to be for courts to
offer better analyses. To start, courts should insist on placing burdens
of proof on the government, particularly regarding the scope and
intensity of the government’s interests, and whether or not restrictions
136
are narrowly tailored. Government actors are in a much better
position to offer evidence regarding their interests, especially security
interests. They are also in a better position to show what limits they
face regarding resources, and why ostensibly feasible, and less
restrictive, alternatives—such as permitting schemes, or bans on

133. E.g., id. at 1139 n.49 (“[W]e hold that there is no constitutional requirement that
protestors be allowed to reach their designated audience in the precise manner of their
choosing.”); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough the
opportunity to interact directly with the [target audience] by, say, moving among them and
distributing literature would doubtless have facilitated the demonstrators’ ability to reach their
intended audience, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted that
sort of particularized access.”). Outside of the specific context of large political events, several
circuits have held that alternatives are not adequate unless they allow the speaker to reach her
target audience. See, e.g., Harrington v. City of Brentwood, 726 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“The key for purposes of the adequate-alternatives analysis is whether the proffered
alternatives allow the speaker to reach its intended audience.” (citation omitted)); Marcavage v.
City of Phila., 481 F. App’x. 742, 747–48 (3d Cir. 2012); Sarre v. City of New Orleans, 420 F.
App’x 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2011). Oddly enough, the Ninth Circuit has seemingly changed course
since its holding in Menotti. See, e.g., Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 858 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]n alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience.”
(quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009)).
134. See, e.g., Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1139 n.49.
135. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 14 (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement
that demonstrators be granted . . . particularized access.”).
136. See, e.g., Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, *26
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004) (“Because a time, place, and manner restriction exists, the defendants
bear the burden of demonstrating that [it] is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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certain materials within a given distance of the event—would not
actually work or would be too burdensome. This would help prevent a
general invocation of “security” from operating as a magic word that
justifies even blanket prohibitions on protest in the absence of
specific threats.
Similarly, courts need to recall that the TMP framework is a test
with elements, and not a balancing test pitting expressive rights
137
against government interests. General reasonableness inquiries are
138
139
the province of the Fourth Amendment, not the First. This also
means that security cannot provide a general context within which the
140
TMP analysis is conducted, and serve as an element within that test.
The needs of government—including security—are already built in to
the analysis.
These two changes are necessary, and relatively easy given current
doctrine, but they are only a first step. Although some commentators
141
have proposed radically overhauling the existing framework, this is

137. See, e.g., Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *29 (noting that the elements of the TMP
analysis “are stated by the Supreme Court in the conjunctive rather than in the disjunctive”).
138. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. See supra note 105.
140. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
141. R. George Wright, for example, has proposed ditching entirely the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions in favor of one that looks at “realistic
repressive potential.” As he has summarized his approach:
[C]ourts should be much more willing to make and defend their best informed
judgments as to the realistic repressive potential of the speech restriction in question.
Once this realistic repressive potential is judicially assessed, the most appropriate
overall judicial test of the speech restriction can be selected and applied, regardless of
whether the speech restriction would be characterized as [content-based] or [contentneutral] under current practice.
Wright, supra note 8, at 335–36 (emphasis added). Such an approach offers several clear
benefits. For one, it seems truer to the Supreme Court’s recognition that political speech
warrants special attention. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (stating
that political speech lies “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”). For another, this
approach would move the focus from both the intent of the legislature and the text of the
regulation to the likely effect. That being said, there are several difficulties that would have to
be resolved. One is how to put this general standard into practice. What test(s) would apply
once the judge had assessed the “likely repressive potential”? A second is the difficulty of the
factual analysis the court will be required to conduct. Any inquiry into the “realistic repressive
potential” would likely be fact-intensive and require no small amount of speculation. Because of
this, what has been criticized as a legally convoluted doctrine, see, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content
Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 232–33 (2012), would be swapped out for difficult
factual inquiries. It is not clear why replacing difficult questions of law with difficult questions of
fact would be an improvement.
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probably unnecessary. Rather, it seems likely that small changes could
be made to how each element of the current test is analyzed, such that
we could discipline courts’ analyses and offer better protection to
speech without overly hampering government interests. Moreover,
making small incremental changes to existing doctrine is simply more
feasible in a common law system.
To begin with the first element—that the government must offer a
142
“substantial” or “significant” interest to justify a TMP restriction —
the government should have to offer specific interests that are
threatened by the speech and conduct that is likely to occur,
particularly when it claims security is at stake. Despite offering
disclaimers to the effect that “[t]he term ‘security’ cannot simply be
143
brandished as a talisman to justify all burdens on speech,” this is
exactly how some courts have behaved. The Tenth Circuit, for
example, upheld a blanket ban on protest within a large “secured
144
zone” outside a NATO conference, when there were no specifically
identifiable threats, because “[i]t goes without saying . . . that security
145
protocols exist to deal with hypothetical risks.” The First Circuit
acted similarly in upholding a security plan that placed protesters
behind two rows of fencing, liquid dispersal mesh, and overhead
netting, even though “there [was] no evidence in the record” that
someone might attempt to break through the fence, or throw items or
146
liquids at convention delegates. In general, courts should bear in
mind that what has happened at past events is clearly relevant, but the
mere fact that something has occurred previously at some other
protest does not mean it will happen at every similar future event.
Whereas the WTO riots resulted in 300 arrests over approximately
147
two days, there were only around twenty-five arrests total at the
148
2012 DNC in Charlotte, and even fewer at the 2012 Republican
149
National Convention (RNC) in Tampa. Not every scenario is the

142. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 (1989).
143. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. Colo. 2008).
144. See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1223–
26 (10th Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 1223.
146. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004).
147. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005).
148. See Jessica Sells, Police: 24 People Arrested During the DNC, WBTV (Oct. 7, 2012,
4:31 PM), http://www.wbtv.com/story/19486640/cmpd-releases-dnc-after-action-report.
149. Colin Moynihan, For the Police and Protesters, a Quieter Convention, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/us/politics/for-police-and-protesters-aquieter-convention.html.
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worst-case scenario; probabilities matter. If we ignore this, the specter
150
of the Seattle WTO riots, and even the terror attacks of September
11th, will swallow the First Amendment based on “mere speculation
151
that violence may occur.”
Addressing the second element—the requirement that TMP
152
restrictions be narrowly tailored —is somewhat more difficult. To be
sure, requiring a higher degree of specificity for the first element will
go a long way toward improving these analyses, by virtue of the fact
that narrow-tailoring is about shaping regulations so that they serve
the government’s interests without reaching further than necessary.
Narrow-tailoring is about precision and reticence: If the concern is
about guns and explosives, employ magnetometers and bomb-sniffing
dogs; if it is about protesters making Molotov cocktails, ban outside
153
bottles and hand out bottled water at the site of the event; and if it
is about sheer numbers of people, use a content-neutral permitting
scheme that limits the numbers of individuals. There are almost
always better options than banning protesters across the board, or
154
restricting them to cages resembling “internment camp[s].” As a
general rule, “the more extensive the restrictions, the more precise the
155
justifications for that restriction must be.”
However, getting the first element right cannot solve every
narrow-tailoring problem. Unless we are willing to employ something
like a “least restrictive means test”—which the Supreme Court has
156
definitively rejected, and which would make intermediate scrutiny
TMP analyses nearly identical to the strict scrutiny employed for
157
content-based distinctions —highly intuitive judgments regarding
government overreach will necessarily play a role. There is simply no

150. See supra Part II.A.
151. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 9751 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
152. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
153. Such an approach might sound unrealistic, but it is not. Something very much like this
happened in 2012 at the RNC in Tampa. See Moynihan, supra note 149 (“[The] police officers in
Tampa [wore protective gear, but nonetheless] . . . appeared to cultivate a friendly relationship
with protesters, often greeting them on sidewalks and . . . at one point dropping off water and
fruit at an encampment of tents and tarps where protesters were sleeping.”).
154. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004).
155. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1176 (D. Colo. 2008).
156. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (“Regulations that burden
speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of expression . . . . [are not invalid]
simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech.”).
157. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1993).
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way around this, and to require a wholly determinate jurisprudence
asks too much. Judges will sometimes get it wrong, but judgment is
required to adapt to changing and unforeseen circumstances.
That being said, we should ask the government to explain, and
judges to evaluate, why alternative measures could not suffice to
protect government interests. Instead of openly deferring to
158
government actors (including law enforcement) on this point, courts
should require proof, and should not uphold speech restrictions when
it would be feasible to employ more limited options (including
ordinary law enforcement methods) that are likely to work nearly as
well. Though, again, this will involve judicial discretion as to when
government restrictions “go too far,” deliberately keeping this burden
of proof on the government would help to ensure that core political
speech is not swept up with proscribable violence.
Making the third element—that government regulations “leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
159
information” —more speech protective could probably be achieved
with one moderate change. Namely, courts should hold that “[a]n
alternative channel is not sufficient if the speakers are not permitted
160
to reach their intended audience.” This makes intuitive sense. If a
protester is denied the ability to get her message across to those who
disagree, or to someone with the political clout to act on her concerns
(and in time for it to make some difference), she is left preaching to
the choir, or hoping that her message “trickles up” to political actors
through whatever channels are available. Debate requires
interlocutors, and political change is exceedingly unlikely in the
absence of felt dissent. This is why, as the Ninth Circuit later opined in
Menotti, “[p]ublic protests are at the heart of the First Amendment
and are critical for incubating civic engagement and encouraging
161
spirited debate.”

158. See, e.g., United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Court will not second guess or substitute its judgment for that of the
NYPD.”).
159. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
160. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 978 (C.D.
Cal. 2000). The Supreme Court has also suggested that such a right may be contained within the
First Amendment. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981) (“The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing
listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1174 (9th Cir. 2005).
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In order to determine whether an alternative channel for
communication is adequate in the context of large political events,
courts could utilize the “sight and sound” standard offered by
162
163
plaintiffs in cases like Coalition to March on the RNC and ACLU.
In ACLU, the court criticized this standard as too vague to be
164
useful. Interestingly, however, the court also pointed to the solution
when it opined that “[w]hat restrictions will permit communication
depend upon the particular circumstances in which they are
165
imposed.” That is, this analysis will have to be contextual, and will
have to focus on the message that the speakers actually seek to
166
convey, in addition to the audience to whom they seek to convey it.
Generally speaking, marches can get their point across from a further
distance than can individuals with picket signs, and sound
amplification may be logistically necessary in a large rally, but not in a
public park. Accordingly, applying this standard would be factintensive—but no more so than existing doctrine.
To be clear, the changes in doctrine and application proposed here
cannot fix every problem. They cannot solve problems of having many
speakers and too few spaces to accommodate them all. Though this is
clearly a First Amendment concern, there will be times when
demands for space and resources outstrip supply, and there is little
that one can do about the fact that two individuals cannot occupy the
same space at the same time. These changes also provide no answer to
the question of how much deference a court should give to a speaker
162. Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014,
1016–17 (D. Minn. 2008).
163. ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149, 1181 (D. Colo. 2008).
164. More specifically, the court asked a series of rhetorical questions to probe whether
there could be such a standard:
Although the following questions might seem rhetorical, if the term “within sight and
sound” is a legal standard, they must be answered in order to formulate a definition.
From whose vantage point is “sight” or “sound” measured—the speaker or the
audience? . . . Is a speaker within “sight” if she is merely within the range of normal
visual perception (potentially thousands of feet under certain conditions)? Or does
“being within sight” limit the range to that in which a speaker can be identified as a
person, or where attributes of that person can be distinguished, or when a sign with
text of a particular size held by the speaker can be read by the viewer? Is the speaker
within “sound” of her audience if the audience can perceive that someone is speaking,
or must the audience be able to discern the content of the message? Does the effect of
cacophony or background noise change the calculation? Does amplification matter, or
is it required?
Id. The court concluded: “[D]espite its catchy and cogent format, the phrase “sight and sound”
does little more than restate the obvious—expressive speech is designed to communicate.” Id.
165. Id.
166. For a proposal along these lines, see Knicely & Whitehead, supra note 87, at 484–87.
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regarding the content of her message, and to whom she wishes to
communicate. There will be times when courts have to say “just
167
because the plaintiffs say so, does not make it so.” But the few
changes proposed do not require radical departures from existing
doctrine, and they will help to avoid situations in which dissent is
literally caged.
CONCLUSION
It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that the “law of large
168
political conventions” has turned the First Amendment on its
169
head : Core political speech, long viewed as living at the heart of the
First Amendment, has been heavily and repeatedly restricted as a
means of guarding against violent conduct, often based on weak or
nonexistent evidence of actual danger. And federal courts, at both the
district and appellate levels, have warped First Amendment doctrine
to offer their blessings to such impediments. Justice Robert Jackson
long ago noted the dangerous tendency to “reduce our liberties to a
170
shadow, often in answer to exaggerated claims of security.” That
concern remains as real now as it was then. And unless courts are
prepared to do more than pay lip service, and are willing to apply
proper scrutiny to regulations that limit core political speech, we risk
the slow erosion of the very political rights that ensure that our form
of government is, and remains, democratic.

167. See Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 271
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Simply because Plaintiffs feel that no other location in New York City is
worthy of their cause . . . does not make it so.”).
168. Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (referring to the law it
applied as “The Law of Demonstration Zones”).
169. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (“The argument, in
essence, is that protected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This
analysis turns the First Amendment upside down.”).
170. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 116
(1951).

